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1. Introduction
More and more economists feel that game-theoretic analysis may help to
better understand a variety of economic processes. Examples of theoretical
and applied work in this area are: Kreps and Wilson (1982 b) on oligopo-
listic competition; Shaked and Sutton (1984) on wage bargaining; de Zeeuw
(1984) on policy design; Grossman and Richardson (1985) on international
trade; Withagen (1984) on exhaustible resources; Binmore and Herrero
(1985) on price mechanisms; Kooreman and Kapteyn (1985) on labor supply
decisions.
It is often observed that the parties involved (i.e. the players in the
game) have conflicting objectives and tend not to cooperate. Furthermore,
when promisses are not binding (i. e. no commitments can be made), players
tend not to believe each others announcements, unless credibility is
beyond dispute.
The theory of non-cooperative dynamic games forms a natural framework to
describe behaviour in the processes above (see Basar and Olsder (1982)).
The most important equilibrium concept in non-cooperative games is due to
Nash (1951) and has become known as Nash equilibrium (NE). In a NE the
strategies are such that none of the players can improve upon the outcome
of the game, given the strategies of his opponents; thus in a NE no one
can achieve a better pay-off as long as the others do not deviate from
their equilibrium strategies. An important property of the NE concept is
time-consistency on the equilibrium path; that is: reoptimisation does not
change the planned actions for the remainder of the game as long as every-
one plays his equilibrium strategy.
A typical feature of most bargaining situations is that threats (defined
as announcements on future moves in the geme) are not binding. This im-
plies that the players can reoptimize at any decision node, whereever the
game has evolved to thus far. If, - faced with the developments thus far
as a fait accompli -, it is not rational to execute a threat, the threat
is called incredible. Strategies in a NE may contain such incredible
z
threats; in other words: the NE concept cannot assure time-consistency off
the equilibrium path (see Meijdam and de Zeeuw (1986) for a discussion of
time-consistency in dynamic game theory).
This drawback of the NE concept lead Selten (1975) to refine NE and to
introduce the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (PE). Subgame per-
fectness is defined as time-consistency off the equilibrium path. The PE
concept prescribes that every player chooses a Nash-strategy for the re-
mainder of the game, for every informationset that can be reached (inclu-
ding the ones that will not be reached in equilibrium). That is: no player
can unilaterally improve upon his pay-off by reoptimisation, whatever has
happened so far. When PE strategies are played, the corresponding outcome
of the game is self-enforcing and the threats involved are credible.
This paper is concerned with the implementation of this PE concept into
bargaining theory. A seminal contribution is Rubinstein (1982), whose
analysis of a two player bargaining model serves as the point of depar-
ture.
Section 2 describes the main features of the basic model. Two players
(e.g. worker and firm, union and employer's organisation or government and
private sector) have to reach an agreement on the partition of a pie (e.g.
a wage increase or the benefits of economic growth). On turn each player
makes a proposal and his opponent either accepts or rejects.
In case of acceptance the bargaining ends and in case of rejection the
bargaining continues with a proposal by the opponent in the next round,
etcetera. In this model the NE concept cannot predict an outcome; in fact
it will be shown that any partition is the outcome of some NE strategies.
Moreover, - and this is worse -, NE strategies generally contain incre-
dible threats and one of the players can anticipate on this and obtain a
better expected pay-off by deviating from his NE strategy. In contrast the
PE concept is able to predict self-enforcing outcomes as the result of PE
(subgame perfect) strategies. Mostly, the set of PE outcomes consists of
only one element: the unique PE outcome of the bargaining game. These
result have been proved in Rubinstein (1982) and are reconstructed in this
paper using arguments presented in Shaked and Sutton (1984) and Sutton
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(1986). At the end of section 2 i t is shown that risk aversion is a dis-
advantage in the model ( see Roth (1985)).
Section 3 deals with asymmetries in the bargaining procedure. One of the
players (i.c. the firm) is allowed to switch to an other opponent if no
agreement is reached after some minimum number of bargaining rounds. The
effects of such an outside option is analysed in Shaked and Sutton (1984).
Their main result is generalized: firstly a broader class of preferences
is considered (including the case of different discountfactors and the
case of fixed bargaining costs per round); secondly the players may have a
different reactiontimel and finally not only the PE outcome for the origi-
nal game is given, but also the PE outcomes for every subgame (if no
agreement has been reached yet, for whatever reason).
Section 4 analyses incomplete information.2 Following Rubinstein (1985a)
it is assumed that one of the players (i.c. the worker) is unsure about
his opponent's time preferences: either he is strong (i.e. the patient
type) or he is weak (i.e. the impatient type). It is shown that if the
opponent's type is weak, then he is better off in the incomplete informa-
tion case (bluffing?) and if he is strong, then he is better off in the
complete information game. More specifically: above some critical reputa-
tion of being strong, the opponent (whether weak or strong) will get the
same equilibrium outcome he would get when he was known to be strong.
Below that reputation his equilibrium pay-off is worse, but always at
least what he would get when he was known to be weak. An interesting re-
sult in this incomplete information case is further that equilibrium may
involve periods of disagreement (which ís irrational in the complete in-
formation case).
Section 5 is an application of the basic model to optimal control in a
policy-model (see Stefanski and Cichocki (1986)).
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
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2. kki I nt.ec~nl. Monopoly
2.1 The Basic Bargaining Model
Consider the following problem:
A firm wants to hire a worker, whose reservation wage equals zero and
whose (normalised) gross labor value is to be divided between wage w and
profit (1-w), w E[0,1]. What strategies will the firm and the worker
adopt in trying to reach an agreement? What agreement(s) will emerge as a
result of the strategies chosen?
To answer these questions, which are typical for the so-called strategic
approach3, it is useful to construct a game theoretic bargaining model.
The bargaining process is represented as a non-cooperative dynamic game,
in which the players move sequentially. None of the players has an outside
option, information is complete and the bargaining procedure is as follows
(see Rubinstein (1982)):
Figure 1
Game 1 Bilateral Monopoly















In the first bargaining round (t-0) the firm proposes some wage w0 E(0,1]
to the worker at stage 6- a. If the worker accepts by playing AO - Y at
stage 8- b, the game ends and the outcome is (w,t) -(w0,0). If, however,
the worker rejects w0 (i.e. AO - N) then he can make a counteroffer wl in
the second bargaining round t-1 at stage 8- a. Now it is the firm's turn
either to accept or to reject this wl, at stage 8- b, the first move
leading to the outcome (w,t) -(wl,l) and the latter to another proposol,
w2, in the third round, etcetera.
Note that the original game reappears every two rounds.
To describe (equilibrium) strategies in game 1, some straightforward nota-
tion is introduced.
f:- (A0, wl, AZ, w3, ... ) : worker's strategy (player 1)
g~- (w0. A1. w2, A3, ... ) : firm's strategy (player 2)
t E{0, 1, 2, 3, ...} : bargaining rounds, discrete time
9 E{a, b} : subdivision of a round t;
at stage a the wage wt is proposed
and at the subsequent stage b the
reaction At on wt is given.
wt E[0,1] : wage proposal at t
At E{Y, N} : reaction on wt: Y means
"accept wt" and N means "reject wt"
P(f, g) E[0,1] x{0, 1, 2, 3, ...}: bargaining outcome when the workers
plays f and the firm plays g. If
agreement is ever reached (i.e. At -
N,b't), then assign P(f, g) -(w,m)
for some w E[0,1] to denote perpe-
tual disagreement.
?i : complete, reflexive and transitive
preference relation of player i over
the set of ordered pairs P(f,g) E
[0,1] x{0, 1, 2, ...}; i- 1, 2.
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2.2 Nash Equilibrium
Firstly the conventional Nash equilibrium concept in the game 1 is defined
(see Nash (1951)).
Definition 1(Nash equilibrium; rationality ex ante).w x
A pair of strategies ( f , g) is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) ifii M NA) P(f~, BM) ~1 P(f~ B) , ef
B)Plf.g)~2P(f.B) .d8
The definition requires that none of the players has an incentive to devi-
ate from this strategy, given the strategy of his opponent.
Two things are not attractive in the NE concept here. Firstly, it cannot
predict certain outcomes of the game (see proposition 1 below) and second-
ly, many NE strategies are not time-consisten off the equilibrium path
(i.e. not subgame perfect, see example 1 below).
Let time be valuable for both, wage desirable for the worker and profit
for the firm.4 Then:
Proposition 1 (weakness NE)
N M N M(f ,g ) NE such that P(f ,g ) - (w,t) c~ (w,t) )1 (0,0)
(w,t) ~2 (1,0)
Proof
(~)To see that the conditions are necessary, suppose one of the condi-w w
tions is not satisfied. Then (f ,g ) cannot be a NE~ if (0,0) )1 (w,t)
then the worker can better change his strategy and accept anything at t-0;
also if (1,0) )2 (w,t) then the firm can better change its strategy and
propose
w - 1 at t- 0.0
(~) To prove sufficiency, suppose for some w E[0,1] and some t E{0, 1,
2, ...}~(wMt) ) (0,0) and (w,t) ?2 (1.0).
~ w wA NE (f ,g ) leading to the outcome P(f ,g )-(w,t) can be construc-
ted as follows:
until t is reached, the firm constantly proposes full profit (i.e. ws
- 0, s- 0, 2, .. , i0 with t0 - t-2 if t even and TO - t-1 if t odd)
and rejects anything less (i.e. As - N if ws ) 0; As - Y if ws - 0,
s- 1, 3, ... . 21 with ~[1 - t-2 if t odd and T1 - t-1 if t even).
Also the worker constantly proposes full wage (i.e. ws - 1, s- 1,
3, .. , T1) and rejects anything less (i.e. As - N if ws t 1; As - Y
if ws - 1, s- 0, 2, .. , TO). From the period t onwards, the firm as
well as the worker propose w(i.e. ws - w, s- t, t} 1, ... ) and
the worker rejects any smaller wage (i.e. As - N if ws ( w; As - Y if
ws 2 w, s- TO t 4, ... ) and the firm rejects any larger wage (i.e.
As - N if ws ) w; As - Y if ws S w, s- il ; 2, T1 t 4, ... ).
If t'or example t is even, then we construct (i0 z t-2; T1 - t-1):
N
f-(AG. 1, AZ, 1, ... . A,~ . 1. A,~ t2' w' AT }4 , ... )
0 0 0
N
g-(0. A1. 0, A3, ... , 0. AT . w, A,~ t2, w, .
1 1
For t is odd we have (TO - t-1; T1 - t-2):
w
f - (A0, 1, AZ, 1, .
M
g - (o. A1. o, A3. ...
)
, 1. AT w, AT t2, w, AT t~, w, .
0~ 0 0
, A,~1, 0, A,~1~2, w. AT1;4, w. ... )
)
N i N M N M
By construction of (f ,g ) ,P(f ,g )-( w,t). To see that (f ,g ) is a NE
we have to check:
M
(w.t) ?1 P(f.g ) . vf
N
(w.t) ~2 P(f .g) . dg
N N
Given g the worker cannot improve upon the outcome by changing f, be-
N
cause either he can get P(f,g )-(O,s) for some s E{0, 1, 2, ... , t-1}
N
or he can get P(f,g )-( w,s) for some s E{ttl, t42, ... }. In both cases
(w,t) is preferred: (w,t) )1 (0,0) )1 (O,s), s ~ t respectively (w,t) )1
(w,s), s 2 t.
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.Also for the firm, given f, the only alternative outcomes that can be
~ M
reached are P(f ,g) -(l,s) for some s~ t or P(f ,g) -(w,s) for some s~
t. In both cases (w,t) is preferred: (w,t) ~2 (1,0) )2 (l,s) , s( t
respectively (w,t) ~2 (w,s) , s 2 t.
r w
Thus (f ,g ) is a NE. o
Note that proposition 1 implies that in the first round (t-0) any wage w E
[0,1] can be the result of a NE. Moreover, a NE wage w-0 or w-1 can only
occur in the first bargaining round; NE wages between 0 and 1 may occur in
some future bargaining round t(if (w,t) ~1 (0,0) ~(w,t) )2 (1,0)).
The following example illustrates the (well known) fact that Nash equili-
bria can be time inconsistent off the equilibrium path (subgame imperfect-
ness).
Example ( time-inconsistency NE off the equilibrium path).
Consider the utility functions:
ul(w,t) - blt w : discounted wage
u2(w,t) - b2t (1-w): discounted profit
and let bl - 0.4 and ó2 - 0.9 be the discountfactors.5r w
A NE leading to the outcome P(f ,g )-(0.5, 0) is:
w
f - (A0, 0.5, A2, 0.5, . )
M
g - (~.5, A1, 0.5, A3, ... )
with As - Y if ws 2 0.5
- N if ws ( 0.5, s- 0, 2, 4, ...
As - Y if ws 5 0.5
- N i f ws ~ 0. 5, s- 1, 3. 5. ...
9
M M
Although (f ,g ) is a NE, it is easily seen that these strategies are not
likely to be played if no commitment is made with respect to announced
behaviour.
Suppose fo~ example that the firm proposes w0 - 0.4 in the first round.
Following f the worker rejects w0 and the outcome for the remainder of
the game is (0.5, 1). But if the worker expects this to happen, then,
- faced with w0 - 0.4 as a fait accompli -, he can better accept w0, be-
cause ul(0.4,0) - 0.4 ) 0.2 - ul(0.5,1). Thus the threat of the worker to
reject any wage less than 0.5 in the first round is incredible to a for-
ward looking firm, which expects the worker to reoptimise at each decision
node. In fact it will be shown below (corollary 1) that the firm can pro-
pose a wage w0 as low as y- 37 and it is still rational for the worker to
accept this w0.
2.3 Perfect equilibrium
To reduce the set of equilibrium wages and to avoid time inconsistent
behaviour of the equilibrium path the concept of Perfect equilibrium (PE)
is a very useful refinement of the NE concept. The PE concept (for dyna-
mic, extensive form games) is due to Selten (1975). To define PE subgame-
strategies are needed:
f I tS : worker's subgamestrategy after the game has evolved just up to
stage ta; t E{0, 1, 2, ... }
8 E {a,b}
g I t9 : idem firm.
From figure 1 it is easily seen that:
f - (A0, wl, A2, w3, ... )
fl0a - f
fl0b - f
g - (w0, A1, w2, A3, ... )
gl0a - ÍwO, A1, w2, .




f~la - (wl, A2, w3, ... )
f~lb - (A2, w3, A4)
f~2a - f~lb
f~2b - f~lb
fl3a - (w3. A4, w5, ... )
fl3b - (A~, w5. A6, ... )
g~la - g~Ob
g~lb - B~Ob
g~2a - (wZ. A3. w4, ...
gl2b - (A3. wy. A5, ...
g~3a - g~2b
gl3b - gl2b etc.
)
)
Definition 2(Perfect equilibrium; Bilateral Monopoly; rationality in all
possible subgames)
w w
A pair of strategies (f ,g ) is called a Perfect equilibrium (PE) if vt E
{0, 1, 2, ... }, vg E {a,b};
A) P(fK~tg. g~~tg) ?1 P(fltg. g~~tg), dflta
B) P(f~ lte, g~ltg) ?2 P(f~ ltg. glt~). dglts
In order to get a set of requirements that is easier to handle, Rubinstein
(1982) uses an alternative definition.
Reformulation definition 2
Consider the bargaining game 1, figure 1 and let f~t :- f~t and g~t .-a ~
f~ta be the subgamestrategies at the begin of round t(as defined above).
The PE conditions A and B are equivalent with:
A) if t odd (i.e. the worker is to make the proposal wt);
(1) P(f-~t, g~~t) ?1 Plflt, gM~t), vf~t
(11) At-1 - Y~ Í wt-1' t-1) )1 P(f~t. g~~t). vf~t
il
. .
(iii) At-1 - N~ P(f It. g It) ~1 (wt-1' t-1)
B) if t even (i.e. the firm is to make the proposal wt):
(1) P(f~~t. g~~t) ?2 P(f~~t. g~t), dg~t
N
(11) At-1 - Y~(wt-1' t-1) )2 P(f ~t. g~t). dg~t
O N
(iii) At-1 - N~ P(f ~t, g ~t) ~2 (wt-1' t-1)
Proof
Part A of this reformulation prescribes rational Nash behaviour for the
worker in every stage of the game: (i) ensures each wage proposal he makes
is rational (i.e. Nash behaviour at the begin of each bargaining round)
and (ii)~(iii) ensure every reaction is rational (i.e. Nash behaviour
within any round, after being faced with a certain proposal as a fait
accompli).
Similarly part B prescribes rationality for the firm in every decision
node, after every history. o
To construct PE strategies and to characterize PE outcomes the following
functions are essential:
di : [0,1] ~ [0,1] , i - 1, 2.
dl(x) .- min w
(w,0) ~1 (x,l)
d2(Y) :- max w
(w.1) ~ (Y.2)
dl(x) gives the minimum wage the worker will accept now, given the wage-
outcome x in the next round; 1-d2(y) gives the minimum profit the firm
will accept now, given the profit-outcome 1-y in the next round.




vs, t E{0, 1, 2, ... } vw~, w, w E[0,1]
[w~ ~ w ~ (w~.s) ~i (w.t). dJ ~ (w~s) ~i (w't)J
stationarity:
ds, t E{0, 1, 2, ... } dw1, w2 E[0,1]
L(w1.s) ?i ( w2. s } 1) p(wl,t) ?i (w2. t} 1)J
increasing compensation
rEl such that (w,t) ~1 ( w t E1(w), t ~ 1) ~ 61 increasingl
Lre2 such that ( w,t) ~2 ( w } E2(w), t . 1) ~ e2 decreasing1J
The interpretation of continuity and stationarity is straightforward.
Increasing compensation means that the worker (resp. the firm) suffers
more from a delay (i.e. needs more compensation in the future) the higher
the postponed wage (resp. profit) is.
Under these assumptions the results in Rubinstein (1982) can be summarised
as follows:
Proposition 2(PE in game 1, complete information)
A) (i) y E[0,1] is a PE wage proposal by the firm e~ y- dl(d2(y))
(ii) x E[0,1] is s PE wage proposal by the worker c~ x- d2(dl(x))
B) At least one wage y E[0,1] satisfies y- dl(d2(y)) and also at least
one wage x E[0,1] satisfies x- d2(d1(x)).
C) t E{0, 2, 4, ... }:
(w,t) resp. (w,t;l) is a PE outcome of the subgame starting in round t
resp. t t 1 e~ w- y resp. w- x.
Proof
The proof of part B is straightforward: from the continuity of preferen-
ces, dl and d2 and thus D12:- dl 0 d2 and D21:- d2 0 dl are continuous.
The compactness of [0,1] ensures D12 and D2, have at least one fixed point
y respectively x.
The proof of part A and C resembles an idea presented in Shaked and Sutton
(1984) and Sutton (1986). For the original, mathematically more elaborated
proof see Rubinstein (1982).
(c) For y and x satisfying the righthandside conditions y- dl(d2(y)) and
x- d2(dl(x)), consider the following pair of strategies:
R
f - (A~, x, A2, x, .
g
.
- (y. A1. y. A3 ... )
with
At -Yifwt2y
- N if wt ( y
At}1 - Y if wttl s x
- N if wttl ) x , t- 0, 2, 4, ..
It is easily checked that part A of reformulation of PE holds for t-o
M ~1
and part B for t-1. This is sufficiënt for (f ,g ) to be a PE, because
after two rounds the original game reappears and the preferences are
stationary.
(~) Now it has to be proved that y- dl(d2(y)) holds for every PE wage
proposal by the firm and x- d2(dl(x)) for every PE proposal by the
worker. Let y be a PE wage proposal by the firm, reached in some bar-







By definition of PE, y must be a PE wage of the subgame starting at t.
Moreover, - because every two rounds the original game reappears -, y must
be a PE wage of the subgame starting at t t 2.
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Now let W1 be the maximum wage (i.e. 1-W1 is the minimum profit) the firm
is willing to accept in the subgame starting at t t 1. The firm's rational
move at t t 1 is only to accept wt}1 if wt}1 pays at least what y pays at
t t 2. Thus the maximum is:
W1 - max wttl -: d2ÍY)
(wttl,ttl) ?2 (Y,tt2)
Also in the subgame starting at t a proposal wt is only acceptable to the
worker if wt at t pays at least what he can expect to attain maximally at
t} 1, i.c. W1. Because (y,t) is a PE outcpme, the firm's proposal y shall
equal this minimum acceptable wage:
Y - min wt -: dl(W1)
(wt,t) ~1 (wl, ttl)
Substitution leads to the required result: y- dl(d2(y). Similarly it can
be derived that x- d2(dl(x)) holds for any PE wage proposal by the wor-












Again x is also a PE wage of the subgames starting at t t 1 and t t 3. For
the minimum wage the worker is willing to accept at t t 2( denoted by W2)
the following equality holds:
W2 - min wt}2 -: dl(x)
(wt}2, tt2) ~1 (x, t43)
Also in the subgame starting at t t 1, a proposal wt41 is only acceptable
to the firm if the profit 1-wt41 is at least as valuable as the maximum
attainable profit at t t 2, i.c. 1-W2. Because (x, t;l) is a PE outcome of
15
that subgame, the worker's proposal shall equal this minimum acceptable
profit:
1-x - min (1-wtti)
(wt~i. tti) ~2 (w2. tt2)
In other words:
x - max wttl
(wtti. tti) ?2 (w2. tti) - : d2(w2)
Thus x - d2(di(x)).
Part C of the proposition is evident from the construction of PE strate-
gies above. o
corollary 1 (fixed discounting factors~)
Let ui(w,t):- Slt w
and u2(w,t):- b2(1-w) , bi b2 ~ 1
represent the worker's and the firm's preferences (i.e. discounted wage
respectively discounted profit). Then the bargaining game 1 has unique PE
wages:
bi(1-b2)
y- 1- b b is the unique PE wage proposal by the firm1 2
1 - b2
x- 1- b b is the unique PE wage proposal by the worker1 2
Proof
In this case di(x) - min w- bi x
w 2 bi x
and d2(y) - max w - 1- b2 t b2y
1-w Z b2(1-y)
Solving for y- di(d2(y)) and x- d2(di(x)) and applying proposition 2
gives the result o
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Notice that the unique outcome of the game 1(starting at t-0) is (y,0).
Example, continued (time consistency PE off the eq. path). For bl - 0.4
and b2 - 0.9 the only PE wage the firm can propose is y-? and the onl37 y
PE wage the worker can propose is x- 3. It is rational for the opponent
to accept this and to reject anything that gives him less (see PE strate-
gies in proof of proposition 2, part B(a)).
Note that the player whose turn it is to make a proposal can use the fact
that his opponent is impatient to achieve a better result; it is an advan-
tage to be the one msking an offer (i.c. 1-y ) 1-x and x~ y).
2.4 Risk aversion
The role of risk aversion in the bargaining game 1 is studied in Roth
(1985). Risk aversion is reflected within a bargaining round as a concave
transformation over the utilities8.
Risk neutral:
ul(w.t) - blt w
u2(w,t) - b2t (1-w)
Risk averse:
ul(w.t) - blt hl(w)
u2(w.t) - b2t(1-h2(w))
with hl(0) - h2(0) - 0
h2(1) - h2(1) - 1
hl continuous, increasing and concave
h2 " , decreasing and convex
17
Figure 2










To see that risk aversion is a disadvantage in the game 1 we define as
before:
dl(x):- min w - álx
ul(w,0) 2 ul(x,l)
~1(x):- min w - hll(blh(x))
ul(w,0) ~ ul(x.l)
d2(y):- max w - 1- b2 ~ b2y
u2(w,0) Z u2(y,l)
d2(y):- max w - h21(1-ó2 . bZh2(y))
u2(w,0) 2 u2(y,l)
With these functions and proposition 3 Roth (1985) proved:
Proposition 3(risk aversion is disadvantageous).
Let xI and yi be PE wage proposals in the game 1 between a risk-neutral
worker and a risk-neutral firm. Let further xIi, yli and xiII, yiii be PE
proposals in the game 1 between a risk-averse worker and a risk-neutral
firm respectively between a risk-neutral worker and a risk-averse firm.
18
Then:
A) xII 5 xI S xIII
B) yII 5 yI S yIlí
Proof
The proof is only given for the utility-functions given above. Using the
same arguments the more general case with ul(w,t) -~lt vl(w) and u2(w,t)
-~2t v2(w) can be treated ( see Roth (1985) and note ~).
Define D21(x):- d2(dl(x)); D12(Y)-- dl(d2ÍY));
D21(x).- d2(~1(x)); D12(Y):- dl(d2(Y)).
From proposition 3 it follows that xI is a fixed point of D21; yI is a
fixed point of D12; xII is a fixed point of D21 and ylI is a fixed point
of D12.
Because of the concavity of hl, hl(blw) Z blhl(w), vw. Using the monotoni-
city this implies:
Slx - hll(hl(Slx) 2 h1lÍslhl(x))
Substitution gives:
D21(x) - d2(dl(x)) - 1- b2 t b2 hll(Slh(x))
s 1- b2 } b2blx - D21(x)
Thus xII s xI
19
Fi re
Illustration of the proof
T N
ylt ~ ~1 l
Also:
D12(Y) - hll(blh(1 - b2 t b2Y)) S bl hll(h(1-52 t b2Y))
- bl(1 - b2 t ó2Y) - D12(Y)
Thus yll s yl
The proof of xlll 2 xl and ylll 2 yi is similar
a
Proposition 3 implies for example that the equilibrium wage for a risk-
averse worker is lower than the equilibrium wage he would get if he were




3.1 The Insider-Outsiders Model
Following Shaked and Sutton (1984) an outside option is made available to
the firm after having bargained some minimum number of T 2 1 rounds with
the same worker (the insider). If no agreement is reached after T rounds,
the firm is allowed to switch to an other worker (an outsider). After a
switch (St - Y at stage 9- c) the firm again has to barguln at least 7'
rounds with the new insider and is allowed to switch afterwards if no
agreement is reached yet. If the firm dces not switch (St - N), it can
switch again after having rejected the next proposal of the current in-
sider.
As soon as either the insider or the firm accepts a proposal, the bargai-
ninQ game ends.
Figure 2 gives the bargaining proces described above. It is assumed that T
is even. As can be seen this assumption is not restrictive (the procedure
is such that the case for T- t even is identical to the case for T-e
te-1 odd).
At t- K1 .- 0 worker 1 enters the game 2 and bargaining can continue
until the firm decides the switch after T1 2 T rounds. Then at t- K2 .-
T1 worker 2 enters. As long as no agreement is reached this continues and
j-1











































The important thing to notice in figure 2 is that after a switch the ori-
ginal game reappears (with the new insider, worker j.l) and that the sub-
game beginning just before a possible switch (i.e. beginning at some stage
9- c) equals the subgame beginning just before the next possible switch.
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To describe equilibrium in the game 2, the notation needs to be adjusted
somewhat.
Tj E{T, T t 2, .. . } : number of rounds the firm plans to bargain
with worker j.
fj :- (A~(j)~ w1Íj). ... . Tj-2, wTj-1 ) . j- 1, 2, ...
: worker j's strategy
f .- (fl, f2, ... ) : workers' strategy
gj :- (w~(j), A1(j)~ ... ~ wTj-2' '1'j-1 and S,I,j-1), j- 1, 2, ...
: firm's subgamestrategy during negotiations
with worker j.
g .- (gl, g2, ... ) : firm's strategy
t E{0, 1, 2, ...} : bargaining rounds
8 E{a, b, c} : subdivision of s round t; at stage 8- a Wt
is proposed, at the subsequent stage 8- b
the reaction At is given and at the subse-
quent stage 8- c(where relevant) a switch
decision St is taken.
ws(j) E[0,1] : wage proposal in s-th round with worker j,
s - 0, 1, ... , Tj-1
As(j) E{Y,N} : reaction on Ws(j)
Ss(j) E{Y,N} : switch decision in s-th round with worker j,
s - T-1, T.1, ... , Tj-1.
P(fj,Bj) E[0,1] x{Kj, Kj.l, ... , Kj~l-1}
: bargaining outcome for worker j when the firm
plays g; and the worker fj. If agreement is
reached at t E{Kj, Kjtl, ... , Kj41-1} then
P(fj,gj) -(wt,t). If no agreement is reached
(i.e. a switch occurs), then assign P(fj,gj)
-(0, Kj}1-1) to denote the worst that can
happen to worker j.
P(f,g) E[0,1] X{0, 1, 2, ...}
: bargaining outcome for the firm when the firm
plays g and the workers play f. Assign P(f,g)
~(w,m) for some w E[0,1] to denote perpe-
tusl disagreement.
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: complete, reflexive and transitive preference
relation j-th worker over set of ordered
pairs P(fj,gj).
: idem firm, over pairs P(f,g).
Notice that the number of rounds that worker j may be in the game (Tj) can
change as the workers' strategy f and the firm's strategy g changes.
By assumption Tj 2 T and Tj may go to infinity to indicate that no switch
occurs after worker j has entered the game.
3.2 Nash Equilibrium
As before the NE concept is not very appropriate to describe behaviour in
the game 2: it cannot single out an outcome and it is subgame imperfect.
The arguments to illustrate this can be found in section 2.2.
3.3 Perfect Equilibrium
The PE concept is as powerful in the bargaining game 2 as it was in the~
original game 1. Equilibrium wage proposals can be fully characterised for
any stage the game can reach (for whatever reason); also it will be found
that in equilibrium the firm will switch whenever an opportunity has
arised.
Definition 3(Perfect Equilibrium; Potential Outsiders)
M N
A pair of strategies ( f ,g ) is called a PE in the game 2 if:
A) if worker j has entered the game at t- Kj, then:
vt E{Kj, Kjtl, ... , Kj}1}, v9 E{a,b}
w
P(fj Itg~ gj Itg) ~(j) P(fjltg~ gj ~t8)' dfjlt8
B) vt E{0, 1, 2,... }, v8 E{a, b, c}
A N
P(f~~tg, g~~tg) ?2 P(fM~te. ó~te), dg~t8
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Subgamestrategies are defined as in section 2.3.
The same assumptions on the players' preferences are made (time is valu-
able, wage is desirable for a worker and profit for the firm, continuity,
stationarity and increasing compensation; see section 2). Furthermore it
is assumed that all workers have equivalent preferences, denoted by )1.
Proposition 2 can now be extended to characterize PE in the game 2.
Recall:
dl(x) .- min w
(w.0) ?1 (x.1)
d2(Y) .- max w
(w.l) ?Z (Y.2)
Proposition 4(PE in game 2)
A) (i) ys E [0,1] is a PE wage proposal by the firm in the s-th bargai-





YT-2 - dl(d2(Y )) with y:- min {YO' yT-2}
x
ys - yT-2 for s E{T, Tf2, ... , T~-2}
(ii) xs~l E[0,1] is a PE wage proposal by the current insider in the




M N -1 M
xT-1 - d2(dl(x )) with x:- dl (Y )
xstl - xT-2 for s E{T, T}2, ... , T.-2}J
(iii) YO S yT-2
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B) At least one sequence of wages {ys}, {xs~l}, s- 0, 2, ... , Tj-2 as
described in A exists.
C) s E{0, 2, ... Tj-2}; j E{1, 2, 3, ... }:
(w,s) resp. (w,stl) is e PE outcome of the subgame starting in the s-th
resp. (stl)-th bargain round with worker j e~ w- ys resp. w- xstl.
Proof
As in the proof of proposition 2 the reappearance of games plays a crucial
role: the original game reappears if a switch occurs and the subgame just
before a possible switch reappears if a next possibility to switch occurs.
A) (i) and (ii)
(~) Let ys, xs41, s E{0, 2, ... , Tj-2} satisfy the right hand side
conditions and consider the following pair of strategies: the firm
proposes ys in the s-th round, rejects any wage greater thsn xs}1 in
the (s41)-th round and switches if y~ s yT-2; the insider proposes
xs}1 in the (stl)-th round and rejects any wage smaller than ys in
the s-th round. From definition of dl and d2 and the reappearance of
games it follows that neither the firm nor the insider can improve
upon the proposals and reactions in any possible stage of the game.
Therefore the strategies form a PE.
(~) To see that the conditions are necessary, the argument in the proof
of proposition 2(section 2) can be repeated. For the sake of brevity
the details are omitted here.
A) (iii) s
To see that y~ s yT-2, suppose y~ ) yT-2. Then y- yT-2 and substitu-
tion in part A(i) gives:
YT-2 - dl(d2(YT-2))
YT-4 - dl(d2(YT-2)) - YT-2
y~ - yT-2 which contradicts y0 ~ YT-2N
B) From A(i) and A(iii) y- y~. Because the function dl and d2 are con-
M
tinuous functions from [0,1] into [0,1], y are the fixed points of the
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compounded function D12(w) :- dl 0 d2 0 dl 0... 0 dl 0 d2(w). From thew
existence of y the other wages ys can be computed recursively.wThe same holds for x and xstl.
C) This part of the proposition follows from the construction of strate-
gies in part A. o
As in section 2 the results are illustrated with the fixed discounting
factor utility functions.
Corollary 2 (fixed discounting factors)
Let all workers have utilities:
ul(w,t) - blt w if t E{K~, K~tl, ... , K~}1-1}
- 0 elsewhere, i.e. if he does not enter the game (t C K~)
or if a switch occurs (t Z K~tl)
and let the firm's utilityfunction be u2:
u2(w,t) - b2t(1-w) , b152 ~ 1.
Then the bargaining game 2 has unique PE wages:
bl(1-ó2) (1-(álb2)(T-s-2)~2)




ál(1-b2) Í1 - Slk b2k) T-2
y0 -(1-bló2) Í1 - bik}1 b2k)
. k:- 2
ys is the unique PE wage proposals by the firm ( s - 0, 2, .. , T-2).
1
xs - ál ys-1 or equivalently xs - 1- b2 t b2 ys41
xs}1 is the unique PE wage proposals by the insider (s - 1, 3, ... , T-1)
27
Proof
The function dl and d2 are: dl(xs) - bl xs
d2(yg) - 1- b2 , b2 yg
Direct application of proposition 4 leads to:
ys - bl[1-b2 . bib2 - b1b22 t b12 b22 -...
- b (T-s-4)~2 b(T-s-2)~2 t(b b)(T-s-2)~2 Y~1 2 1 2 ' 0
It is easily verified that this equation equals the equation for ys above.
The formula for y0 follows with s- 0. Because proposition 4 implies xs -
d2(ystl) and ys - dl(xs}1), the results for xs are evident.
Several remarks must be made at this point.
1. For equal discountfactors b1 - b2 - b ~ 1, the unique PE outcome is
T-Z
(y0,0), with y0 - 1 S b 1-bT-1 This is the main result in Shaked and1-b
Sutton (1984)9.
Corollary 2 extends this, dealing with the case of different discount
factors bl ~ b2 and describing explicitly equílibrium behaviour as long
as no agreement is reach for whatever ( irrational) reasons. Moreover,
proposition 4 applies to a braoder class of preferences ( see note ~).
2. If T goes to infinity (i.e no switch is ever allowed for), the insider
gets monopoly power and indeed the Bilateral Monopoly result of Rubin-
ól(1-b2) 1 - b2
stein (1982) emerges: y- 1- b b' x- 1- b b(see corollary 1).1 2 1 2
If on the other hand T- 2(i.e. the firm is allowed to switch whenever
it is his turn react), the firm can get full profit and PE wages are
zero:
y - 0 ; x - 0
zs
Notice that w- 0 is precisely the worker's reservation wage; this
competitive equilibrium is here not the result of instantaneous compe-
tition between workers (as in a Walras labor market where a firm can
propose wages to several workers at the same time) but rather of se-
quential competition between workers (the firm threatens to switch to
an outsider, leaving the insider with unemployment and utility zero).
Notice further that the equilibrium wages rise in T: the longer the
firm has to wait on a possible switch, the better is the bargaining
position of the insider.
3. If álá2 approaches unity (i.e. nor the firm nor the workers are impa-
tient) the equilibrium wage y0 - 2T1. Again for T- 1 the reservation
wage w- 0 arises. For T- m, y0 -} is precisely the axiomatic Nash
solution of the corresponding static probleml0
4. If bl - 1 and b2 ~ 1(i.e. only the firm is impatient) then y- x -s s
1, vs, thus the worker can attain full wage in equilibrium. Also, if
bl (1 and á2 - 1 the firm gets full profit: ys - xs - 0.
Another result that can be derived from proposition 4 extends the model to
the case in which the reaction time of the firm respectively the workers
is different (due to for example having to discuss proposals with third
parties).
Corollary 3
Let ~1 be the reaction time of the workers (i.e. the length of the first,
third, fifth. etc. ... bargaining round) and e2 oF the firm.
The gane 2, modified in this way and with preferences as in corollary 2,
has unique PE wage proposals. They can be computed by replacing the dis-
e
count factors bi by ói i
Proof
The functions dl and d2 are now defined as:
A
dl(x) :- min w - bl 1 x
(w~0) ?1 (x.~l)
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d2(Y) :-maxw - 1-b22tb22y
(w.~l) ~1 (Y~ ~1 t o2)
G
Applying proposition 4(corrolary 2 with bi i in stead of bi) leads di-
rectly to the result
G
PE wages are more favourable to the insider the higher his bl 1 or the
A
lower the b2 z of the firm; thus a worker who is less impatient (i.e. bl
larger) and who can react quicker on a proposal has a bargaining advantage
over a worker who is more impatient and reacts shower. The same holds
(mutatis mutandis) for the firm,ll
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4 Bilateral Monopoly, Incomplete Information
4.1 Incomplete Information in the Basic Model
In this section the assumption of complete information, which was essen-
tial in the previous sections, is dropped.
Consider once again bargaining game 1 as described in section 2, figure 1.
Following Rubinstein (1985b) it is now assumed the firm (player 2 in the
game) is of two possible types. Either it is weak or it is strong (in the
sense of relatively impatient resp. relatively patient). The worker (play-
er 1 in the game) does not know the firm's actual type, but nevertheless
he has some belief, say p(t), at round t that the firm is weak. One might
say that 1-p(t) is the reputation of the firm of being strong.
IIefore describing equilibrium in this incomplete informatiion game 1 the
notation of section 2 needs to be extended somewhat. Lower bars are used
for the weak firm and upper bars for the strong firm.
f:- (Ap, wl, A2, w3, ... ) : worker's strategy
g-~:- (wC A1 w2 A,... ) if weak3 ~ : firm's strategy
- 6:- (w~. A1, w2. A3, ... ) if strong
fltg : worker's subgamestrategy at
stage 8 of round t
Bltg - ~ItB if weak
- glt8 if strong
~(f. g. g) :s ~ P(f.g). P(f.g) ~
with P(f,g) E[0,1] x{0, 1, 2, ... }
: firm's subgamestrategy at
stage 6 of round t
: bargaining outcome when the
worker plays f and the firm
plays ~ if its is weak and g




: lottery between the outcome
P(f,g) with probability p
and P(f,g) with probability
1-p, p E [0,1].
: preference relation of the
worker over lotteries be-
tween two outcomes P(f,~)
and P(f,g), both E[0,1] x
{0, 1, 2, ... }
: preference relation of the
firm over outcomes P(f,g) E
[0,1] X {0, 1, 2, ... } :
weak firm: )2 , ~ ,
strong firm: )2 , g .
Definition 4 (the firm's type)
Let, as before, d2(y) :- max w , 2 E{2,2}, 2~ 2.
(w,0) ~2 (Y,1)
If vy E[0,1] such that d2(y) ( 1: d(y) ( d2(y), then the type 2 is said
- 2 - -
to be weak and the type 2 is said to be strong.
The definition says that if the firm can obtain a wage y in the next
round, it shall require a smaller wage (i.e. a higher profit) today when
it's type is strong than it would require when it's type were weak.
If for example )2 can be represented with u2(w,t) - b2t(1-w) with á2 - a E
[0,1] for the wesk firm and b2 - g E[0,1] for the strong firm, then d2(y)
- 1- é2 t b2 y and weakness and strength is defined as: a~ s; the dis-
counting factor of the weak firm is smaller (i.e. it's discount-rate is
bigger, see note 5).
4.2 Nash Equilibrium
The definition of NE is straightforward.
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N r r
Definition 5(Nash equilibrium under incomplete information) (f ,~, g)
is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if
A N M -M 11 -A
A) p0 P(f ,~ ) 8 (1-PO).P(f ,B ) ~1 PO.P(f.~ ) 0 (1-p0).P(f.g ). vf
N . w
B) (i) P(f .g ) ?2 P(f ,~) , dB
M -M A -
(ii) P(f ,g ) ?- P(f ,g) . d8
2
Notice that for p0 - 1 part A and B(i) define NE in the complete informa-
tion game 1 between the worker and a weak firm; also for p0 - 0 part A and
B(ii) define NE between the worker and a strong firm (see definition 1).
As in the complete information case (see proposition 1), the set of NE
outcomes can be quite large.
Proposition 5 (weakness NE)
i1 iF -N N IF -M
(f , ~ , g ) NE such that P(f , ~ , g ) - C (w,t), (w,t) )
a~ A) p0.(w,t) ~ (1-PO).(w,t) ~1 (Q,0)
B) (i) (w.t) ~2 (1,0) n (w,t) ~2 (w,t)
(ii) (w.t) ~ (1.0) ~ (w.t) ~ (w.t)
~2 -2 - -
Proof
M A -M(~) If one of the conditions is not satisfied, ( f ,~ , g) cannot be a
NE: if A is not true the worker can improve by accepting anything at
t- 0; if B(i) is not true, the weak firm can improve by proposing w
- 1 at t- 0 or by playing the strong type; if B(ii) is not true, the
strong firm can improve by proposing w- 1 at t- 0 or by playing the
weak type.
(~) Suppose the conditions hold and let t s t(changing the role of t and- w w -N -t gives the result for t 2 t). A NE (f ,~ , g ) leading to C(w,t),
(w,t) ) is constructed as follows ( cf. proof proposition 1): Until t
is reached the worker constantly proposes full wage and rejects any-
thing less. In rounds t to t-1 he proposes w and rejects anything
less. From t onward he proposes w and rejects anything less.
The weak firm proposes full profit until t is reached and rejects sny
lower profit. From t onwards it proposes w and reject any higfier
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wage. In the same way, the strong firm proposes full profit until t
and w from t onwards.
It is easily checked that none of the players can improve ex ante on
his (expected) outcome. o
For t- t- 0 the conditions A and B are valid for every w- w- w with w
E[0,1]; thus every wage in the first bargaining round can be interpreted
as a Nash wage and NE is not a powerful equilibrium concept. Also, as
before, NE may be time inconsistent (see example 1).
Therefore we need the concept of subgame-perfect equilibrium for incomple-
te information games. Since Kreps and Wilson (1982a) this concept is usu-
ally called "sequential equilibrium".
4.3 Sequential Equilibrium
The worker's initial belief (i.e. the firm's initial reputation of being
weak or strong) and the way in which this belief can change during nego-
tiations, play an important role in describing subgame perfect equilibrium
in the incomplete information game under consideration.
Consider the worker's belief that the firm is weak after the firm's propo-
sal wt, t- 0, 2, 4, ... . The current belief is some function of the
previous belief and of the moves the firm has made in the last two rounds:
P(t) - h(P(t-2). At-1~ wt) ~ t- 2. 4, 6~ ...
PÍ~) - h(P~, w~)
with p~: worker's belief before the game starts.
Generally only socalled plausible beliefs are considered (see Harsanyi
(196711968), Kreps and Wilson ( 1982a) and Rubinstein (1985b)).
Definition 6 (plausible beliefs)
The worker's beliefs {p(t)}t-0,2~~ are said to be plausible if:
A) the worker doesn't change his mind, if he cannot distinguish between
the weak firm's moves (At-1' wt) and the strong firm's moves
(At-1' wt)' At-1 - At-1 - N n h`t - wt - wt ~ P(t) - P(t-2)
B) the worker concludes that the firm is of certain type, if the observed
moves are only compatible with that type: 0 C p(t-2) C 1:
(1) At-1 - N~ Wt - wt n(At-1 - Y v wt ~` wt) ~ P(t) - 1
(il) At-1 - N n wt - wt n(At-1 - Y v wt ~ wt) ~ PÍt) - 0
C) the worker's conclusion that the firm is of a certain type is definite:
(i) p(t-2) - 1 ~ p(t) - 1
(ii) p(t-2) - 0 ~ p(t) - 0
Part A and B of this definition follow from Bayes' rule12; part c also
seems a quite reasonable restriction on the sequence of beliefs.
To define sequentisl equilibrium (SE), the worker's belief at stage 3 of
round t is represented by p(tg) (see figure 1, section 2 for the players'




















Definition ~(Sequential equilibrium; PE under incomplete information)
A A -A
A triple (f ,~, g) and a sequence of beliefs {p(t)}t - ~~ 2~ , are
called a sequentisl equilibrium (SE) if the beliefs are plausible and if
vt E{0, 1, 2, ... }, yg E{a,b}
A) P(t8).P(fA~tB. gAltg) O (1-p(tg)).P(fA~tB' gA) ~1
P(tg).P(fltg. ~Altg) 0 (1-P(tg)).P(fltg. BAItg). df~t9
s) (~) P(fA~tB' ~Altg) ~2 P(fAItB, ~Ite) , d~~tg
M A M
(ii) P(f ~tg. B ~tg) ?- P(f ~t8. g~t8), dB~tB
2
The next proposition compares PE wage proposals (in the complete informa-
tion game) with SE wage proposals (in the incomplete informatíon game).
The worker is better off with a PE wage if the firm is weak and with a SE
wage if the firm is strong. From the point of view of the firm this means
that if it is weak i t may take advantage of it's reputation of being
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strong and if it is strong it may suffer from it's reputation of being
weak.
Proposition 6(incomplete information is advantageous for the weak firm
and disadvantageous for the strong firm).
Let y(2) and x(2) be PE wage proposals by the firm and the worker in the
complete information game with the firm being weak (2) respectively strong
(2). (see section 2, prop. 2). Any SE outcome ~(w,t), (w,t) ~:-
r w w -r - -
~ P(f ,~ ) , P(f ,g )) in the incomplete information game satisfies:
(Y(2).o) il (w.t) and (w.t) ?2 (Y(2).o):
(w.t) ~1 (Y(2),0) and (Y(2).0) ?- (w,t).
2
Similarly for a SE outcome ((v,s), (v,s) ~ in the subgame starting at t-
1:
(x(2),1) ~1 ( v.s) and (v.s) ~2 (x(2),1);
(v,s) ~1 (x(2),1) and (x(2),1) ~- (v,s).
~2
Proof
Since it is not rational for the worker to accept wages smaller than y(2)
and not rational for the firm to propose wages greater than y(2), any SE
wage yt suggested by the firm and accepted by the worker must satisfy:
y(2) 5 yt 5 y(2) , t- 0, 2, 4, ... . Also for a SE wage xt suggested
by the worker and accepted by the firm: x(2) s xt 5 x(2), x- 1, 3, 5. ...
From proposition 2 it follows that
y(2) - dl(x(2)) :- min w and
(w,0) ?1 (x(2).1)
x(2) - d2(Y(2)) :- max w
(w.l) ?2 (Y(2).2) . 2 E {2.2~.
From this it can be easily verified that ~( w,t), ( w,t) ~ cannot be a SE
outcome if one of the conditions does not hold; if for example (y(2),0) C1
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(w,t) or (w,t} ~2 (y(2),0} then w) y(2), thus violating yt 5 y(2). Also
if (w,t) (1 (y(2),0) or (y(2),0) C(w,t) then w~ y(2), thus violating
2
Yt 2 Y(2)
To construct SE strategies and to characterize SE outcomes the following
functions are essential (cf. dl and d2 in section 2):
dlp(x,z) :- min w , x, z E [0,1]; p E[0,1]
(w,0) ~1 p(x,l) ~ (1-p) (z,2)
d2(Y) .- max w , y E [0,1]; 2 E ~2,2~
(w.l) ~2 (Y.2)
dlp(x,z) gives the minimum wage the worker will accept now given some
agreement x in the next round if the firm is weak and some agreement z two
rounds later if the firm is strong. 1- d2(y) gives the minimum profit the
firm will accept now given some agreement y in the next round.
Although the SE concept excludes incredible threats and is thereby time
consistent on as well as off the equilibrium path, it can not in general
single out a typical outcome of the bargaining game (as the PE concept
could in the complete information case, see section 2 proposition 2, co-
rollary 1).
The set of SE outcomes depends heavily on further assumptions on the plau-
sible beliefs; plausibility allows a free choice of the worker's belief
after an unexpected move by the firm. For example the worker may have the
prejudgement that the firm is weak whenever it deviates from a certain
(equilibrium) path (~,g). In that case many SE outcomes are possible:
Proposition 7(SE under optimistic beliefs)
A) vy E[0,1] suCh that (y,0) C1 (x(2),1) n(y,0) ~1 (x(2),1)
3SE such that either
i~ M -N
P(f ,~ , B ) - ~ (Y.0). (Y.0) ~ or
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N N -N
P(f , g . fS ) - ~ (d2(Y),1). (Y.2) ~
B) Similarly in the subgame starting at t- 1:
vx E [0,1] Such that (x,l) (2 (y(2),2) ~ (x,l) )- (y(2),2)
2 -
3SE such that either
N w -NP(f , ~ , g ) - ( (x,l), (x,l) ~ or
N N N
P(f . ~ , g ) - ~ (x.l). (d21(x).2) ~
Proof
A) Suppose for some y E[0,1], (x(2),1) (1 (y,0) ~1 (x(2),1) and let p0 E
[0,1] denote the worker's initisl belief (before the firm's first propo-
sal). If p0 - 0 the worker (thinks he) knows the firm is strong. Because
this conclusion is definite the game then equals the complete information
game and y- y(2) is the unique PE proposal supported by the PE strategiesN N N Ndefined in the proof of proposition 2(the strategies f- f,~ - g and
-N N
g - g are a SE leading to ((y(2),0), (y(2),0)~). Similarly (y(2),0) is
the unique equilibrium outcome if p0 - 1 and is supported by the equili-
brium strategies of proposition 2.
If p0 E(0,1), then consider the following beliefs and strategies:
Beliefs: plausible and in addition optimistic; i.e.
p(t) - 1 if At-1 ~ ~At-1' At-1~
or wt ~ ~Wt-1' wt-1}
, t - 0, 2, 4, ...
MStrategies: f-(AO' wl' A2' w' "' )3
N
g - (W~. A1. w2. A3, ... )
N
B - (W0. Á1, w2. Á3, ... )
with for t- 0, 2, 4, ... as long as p(t) - p:0
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~
f: At - Y if wt 2 dlp(t) (d2(Y)~ Y)
- N if wt ~ d1P(t) (d2(Y)~Y)
wt.l - d2(Y)
w
~ ' Wt - Y
Attl - Y if wttl s d2(Y)
-~ -
` ' wt
- N if wttl ~ d2(y)
- Y
At~l ' Y if wt}1 S d(Y)
2
- N if wttl ~ d (Y)
2
and as soon as p(t) - 0 or p(t) - 1 the corresponding complete
information PE strategies are played, see section 2.3.
Obviously, if y 2 dlp (d2(y),y) then the strategies above lead to the
0 -
outcome ((y,0), (y,0) ) and if y t dlp (d2(y),y) then ((d2(y),1), (y,2)
0 - -
~ is the outcome, because d2(y) ~ d(y) by definition of the firm's type.
- 2
To see that the beliefs and strategies are a SE, first notice that from
the moment p(t) becomes 0 or 1 onwards no deviations are profitable (SE
moves coincide with complete information PE moves). As long ad p(t) - p0,
the worker's optimism prevents the firm to deviate: any deviation leads to
p(t) - 1 and thus to the weak outcome which is worse for both types.
Finally the worker never has sn incentive to deviate either; it is easily
verified that the expected outcome after a deviation is no better than the
equilibríum subgame outcome.
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B) In a similar way a SE with optimistic beliefs can be constructed for
the subgame starting at t- 1 for any x satisfying the conditions given.
This part of the proposition equals the proposition 3 in Rubinstein
(1985b).
Optimistic beliefs as defined in the proof above are assumed by several
authors (e.g. Fudenberg and Tirol (1983) and Perry (1986)). They serve as
a kind of threat to the firm: if it does not stick on the equilibrium
path, the SE outcome for the remainder of the game is the complete infor-
mation PE outcome of the game between the worker and the weak firm. This
is not an attractive prospect for the firm.
Although optimistic beliefs deter best, there are good reasons why they
are not appropriate to describe reality. Why should for example the worker
not conclude the firm is strong if it has revealed its preferences? Or
what arguments does he have to conclude weakness if the firm insists on a
higher profit?
~ 1 cnnillq 111~~1'tz q~i~il'U~11'~iil.p I.I1 1iF~4Ullls~ ~~1? W~~I'~(P1.' p~~~U4~.P ~1~9 (IP) Ic~r ~1! 1-~1n
direction that rationalizes the firm's (unexpected) behaviour:
Definition 8 (rationalizing beliefs) "
The worker's beliefs {p(t)}t-o,2,4, ,,, are said to be rationalizing if:
A) the worker concludes that the firm is strong if it rejects a proposal
and it's counterproposal is worse for the weak firm but at least as
good for the strong firm:
P(t-2) ;~ 1 n At-1 - N n (wt't) ~2 (wt-l~t-1) ~ (wt.t) ?2 (wt-l~t-1)
~ p(t) - 0.
B) the firm's insistence cannot be an indication that i t is more likely to
be weak:
At-1 - N A (wt~t) ~2 (wt-l~t-1) ~ (wt't) ~Z (wt-l~t-1)
~ p(t) S p(t-2)
In Rubinstein (1985b) it is shown that under rationalizing beliefs SE
wages can be characterised as PE wages were characterised in section 2
(proposition 2).
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Proposition 8(SE under rationalizing beliefs).
A) Let beliefs be rationalizing and assume the worker accepts a proposal
wt if he is indifferent between wt and the expected outcome after having
rejected wt and also assume the firm is not allowed to propose anything
less than y(2) (i.e. the wage it would propose when strong).
Finally, let p E(0,1) denote the worker's current belief that the firm is
weak (see figure 5) and let x and y E[0,1] satisfy x- d2(y) ~ y-
dlp(x,Y).
Then for t E{0, 2, 4, ... }:
(i) Y ) Y(Z) ~ ~ (Y,t), (Y,t) ) and ( (x.ttl). ( Y.tt2) )
are the only SE outcomes of the ( sub-) game starting at t
(ii) y ~ y(2) ~ C(y(2),t), (y(2),t) ) is unique SE outcome of the game
starting at t
Similarly for t t 1 E{1, 3, 5, ... }:
(i) y ) y(2) ~ ~ (x,ttl), (y,tt2) ) is unique SE
outcome of the game starting at ttl.
(ii) y~ y(2) ~~ (x(2),t}1), (x(2),ttl) ) is unique SE outcome of the
game starting at tfl.
B) vp E(0,1) at least one pair (x,y) E[0,1] x[0,1] satisfies y-
dlp(x,Y) n x - d2(Y).
The proof of proposition 8 is rather extensive and can be found in Rubin-
stein (1985b).
The example with fixed discounting factors illustrates how the proposi-
tions 7 and 8 work out. The relation between the firm's initisl reputation
and the corresponding equilibria is made explicit.
Example, continued
Consider once again the utility functions:
ul(w,t) - blt w : discounted wage
u2(w,t) - b2t(1-w): discounted profit.
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Let bi - b and b2 - a for the weak firm and b2 - g for the strong firm
(O s b~ 1 ~ O s a ( p s l).
Here:
dip(x,z) - p b x f(1-p) b2 z , p E(0,1)
d2(y) - 1- a t ay
x(2) - 1 - a
- 1 - ab . x(2) - 1
~
1 - pb '
Y(Z) - 1-aba , YÍ2) - i-~~




~ p ~ b~l-atay~t(1-p)by~~ -~ p
Proposition ~ implies that vy E Lb1~Z , bilaó ] there is a SE with opti-
mistic beliefs such that ~(y,0), (y,0) ) is the outcome if the firm's
initial reputation of being strong is large (i.e. y 2 yN, i.e. p 5 p~ and
~(d2(y),1), (y,2) ~ is the outcome if this reputation is lower (i.e. y~
w - w
Y . i.e. p ) p ) .
Part B of proposition ~ implies that
vx E I1 - a t a bl-~~b , 1-S } S i 1-~] there is a SE with optimistic
beliefslllsuch that ~(x,l), (x,l) ~ or C(x,l), (d21(x),2) ) is the outcome
with
d21(x) - 1- iáx if a~ 0
- 1 if a - 0
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It is interesting to note that the interval Lbl~, i 1-á~ J is never
empty, but the interval I1 - a t a bl~s~ , 1- P t~ 1 1-ab] may be
empty:~3 L
ya, ~, b E [0,1] :
IO 5 a(~~ 1~ á~~ C i 1-áb ]
Thus if (a t p)b ~ 1, then:
1- a~ a b~~ ) 1 4
b 1-a
1 - p3b - ~ ~ 1 - ab
Thus Rubinstein's assertion that proposition ~, part B "demonstrates that
the set of SE outcomes is very large" (Rubinstein (1985), p. 1159) is only
valid for values of a, p and E with (a ~ p) b Z 1.
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5 Policy Bargaining in a Dynamic Economy
5.1 The Bilateral Monopoly Policy Model
Consider the system's representation of an economy:
x(t) - F(t, x(t-1), u(t-1))
x(0) - x~
with t E T:- {1, 2, ... , tf} : planperiod
x(0) E X~ .- set of initial states
x(t) E Xt .- set of possible states in period t E T
u(t-1) E Ut-1 .- set of feasible controles in period t-
1, t E T
F: T X Xt-1 X Ut-1 ~ Xt
There are two decisionmakers in this economy. Each of them has the control
over the set of variables ui(t-1) (i - 1, 2, t E T), subset of
u(t-1) :- (ul(t-1), u2(t-1)) E Ut-1 ;- Ult-1 x U2t-1
Controls depend on the information available:
ui(s) - GiÍs; x(0); u(~), ...
ui(~) - ui0




G. : S x XG x TT Uk -~ U. s
1 k-0 1
i E I :- {1,2}
The government is decisionmaker 1(i-1) and the private sector decision-
maker 2 (i-2).
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The decisionmakers are the players in a non-cooperative bargaining game in
which they try to come to an agreement on the controldecisions to be
madei4. The bargaining process resembles the Rubinsteinmodel of section 2
(see Stefanski and Cichocki (1986)):
Figure 6






















In the first bargaining round the private sector makes a proposal concer-
ning all present and future control variables u-(u(0), ... , u(tf-1))
with u(s) E Us, s - 0, 1, 2, ... , tf-1. If the government accepts u by
playing A~ - Y, the game ends and the agreed controls are executed. If
however the government rejects u( AD - N), then disagreement controls are
executed in the first round: ui(0) - uid(0), i- 1, 2 and the bargaining
contiunues with a proposal ul .- (u(0), u(1), ... , u(tf-1)) by the
government with u(0) - ud(0); u(s) E Us, s- 1, 2, ... , tf-1.
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Now it is the private sector's turn either to accept or to reject this
proposal, the first move leading to the agreement ul and the latter to
disagreement controls in the current round: (ui(1) - uid(1)), i- 1,2 and
to another proposal by the private sector in the third round (t-2)
u2 .- (u(0), ... , u(tf-1)) with u(0) - ud(0), u(1) - ud(1) and u(s) E Us,
s- 2, 3, ... , tf-1. Etcetera.
A typical proposal in period t(t - 0, 1, 2, ... , tf) is:
ut .- (u(~). u(1), ... . u(tf-1))
with u(s) - ud(s) if s~ t
u(s) E Us if s 2 t
Here ud(s) -(uld(s), u2d(s)) are the disagreement controls in previous
rounds. For the remaining controls (s Z t) any u(s) E Us may be chosen.
Notice that ut completely characterizes the possible control outcomes of
the policy game 3: any pair of strategies (f,g)
f :- (A~, ul, A2, .
B :- (u. Al, u2, .
Ntf-1
, u ) : government's strategy
, At -1) : private sector's strategy
f
either leads to immediate agreement (P(f,g) - u) or to some later agree-
ment ( P(f,g) - ut, t- 1, 2, ... , tf-1) or to no agreement at ell
ÍP(f,B) - utf)15.
5.2 Nash Equilibrium
An important assumption in Rubinstein's bargaining model is Pareto optima-
lity of every proposal ( i.c. wage is desirable for the worker and undesir-
able for the firm; in other words: no wage is preferred by both players;
the players have conflicting objectives). This assumption is made in the
policy game also: every controlproposal ut is required to be Pareto opti-
mal~group-rational.
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As in section 2(proposition 1) and in section 4(proposition 5) the game
3 has many Nash equilibria.
Proposition 9(NE in policy game 3)
Let ut be Pareto optimal. Then:
(f~,g~) NE such that P(f~,g~) - ut
t tc~ut~lufnut~2uf
Proof
The arguments from the proof of proposition 1 apply. Clearly if one of the
conditions does not hold, then ut cannot be a NE. If the conditions do
hold, a NE is to propose that (Pareto optimal) proposal that pays best and
to reject anything else until t is reached. In period t the controls ut
are agreed upon. o
Under Pareto optimality, the set of NE outcomes coincides with the set of
individual-rational outcomes (i.e. the set of outcomes that both players
t
prefer above the disagreement outcome~threat point u f). As time goes by,
the set of available controlvectors (and it's subset of Pareto-optimal and
individual-rational controlvectors) shrinks, until in the end only the
t
disagreement controlvector u f remains. This is an incentive for the deci-
sionmakers to reach an agreement in an early stage of the game.
Formally, let yt be the set of available controlvectors in period t(t - 0,
1, 2, ... , tf):
wt .- {ut~u(s) - ud(s), s~ t ~ u(s) E Us, s 2 t}
and let 52t be the Pareto-optimal and individualrational subset:
4t .- {ut E yrt~ I~ut E yt: ut )i ut, i- 1, 2] ~
t
ut ~i u f, i- 1, 2.
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Notice that 4tf - ~utf~.
Proposition 10 (Incentive for an early agreement)
Let tl C t2; tl, t2 E{0, 1, ... , t}. Then:
vut2 E S2t2 3~ut1 E S2t1 such that u~l ~i ut2, i- 1, 2.
Proof
t t
By definition of wt~ w 2 C w 1
Choose a vector ut2 E 52t2 and consider the points in wtl`wt2 that dominate
~t2u .
~:- ~tl(ut2) :- ~~tl E wtl`wtZl~tl ~i ut2. i- 1. z~
If ~-~ then take utl - ut2
If ~~!~ then take any utl such that utl )i vtl, vtl E~.
By construction utl E 4t1
To illustrate proposition 10, consider a(utility-) function J-(J1,J2)
that represents the players' preferences:
J: iT Uk ~ R2 such that for ut, vs E IT Uk:
k-0 k-0
tf-1 tf-1
ut )i vs ~ Ji(ut) 2 Ji(vs), i- 1, 2
The sets Xt, Yt and Z correspond to yrt Qt ~d ~:
Xt :- {J(ut) E R2~ut E wt} C R2
Yt :- {J(ut) E Xt~ut E S2t} C Xt
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Z(J) :- {J E Xtl`Xt2~Ji ~ J, i- 1, 2f ,
t
J E Y 2
This is the case Stefanski and Cichaki ( 1986) consider.
Fi re
dl
Illustration of proposition 10
tl C t2:
t
J E T 2
t
3J E Y 1 such that
J1 2 J1 ~ J2 Z J2.
Notice that from proposition 9 and the definition of 4t it follows that
every ut E 4t can be a NE outcome of the policy game; in terms of figure
5: every pay-off J-(J1,J2) E Yt is supported by some pair of NE strate-
gies.
Proposition 10 indicates that this conclusion is not very satisfactiory.
If subgame perfectness is introduced as an additional requirement (see
section 2, definition 2) then PE bargaining strategies generally lead to a
unique PE outcome; a proposition can be derived that resembles the propo-
sitions 2 and 4 of section 2 respectively 3(proposition 11 below).
5-3 Perfect Equilibrium
To characterize PE strategies and PE outcomes in the game 3, define the
following (multi-) functions:
dlt : 4t}1 ~ 4t , t- 0, 2, ... , tf-2.
dlt(uttl) -~ut E Qt~ut ~1 ut}1 ~ wt E Qt: ut ~2 ~t~
If the players can be sure an outcome ut41 will be reached at t t 1, then
the private sector (player 2) shall propose a control ut in the set
t --ttldl (u ); thereby it maximizes it's own utility while knowing the govern-
ment has nothing better to do than to accept ut(ut ~1 uttl) Similarly, if
an outcome ut;2 is expected in the next round, then the government shall
propose a ut}1 in the set d2tt1(ut'2):
d t~l: S2tf2 ~ Qttl2 , t - 0, 2, ... , tf-2
ttl ~tt2 ~t~l t41 ~ttl ~t~2 ~ttl ttl ~ttld2 (u )-~u E 4 ~u ~2 u ~ v E 4 : u )1
vt}1~
Now assume 4t, 4t~1 are compact and preferences )., i- 1, 2 are conti-
nuous. Then dlt and d2t are not empty and PE strategies and PE outcomes
can be computed as follows:
~1
Proposition 11 (PE in game 3)
A) yt E 4t is a PE control proposal by the private sector in round t and
xt}1 E 4t}1 is a PE control proposal by the government in round t} 1,
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t E {0, 2, , tf-2} ra
E dl~(scl); x' E d21(Y2);
y~ t dl`(.:j); x3 E d23(Y ):
Ntf-2 tf-2 ~tf-1 Ntf-1 tf-1 tf
y E dl (x ) ; x E d2 (y )
with ytf .- utf : disagreement controls.
P) At least orie sequence of proposals yt, xt41 t- 0, 2, ... , tf-2 as
described above exists.
C) ut, ut{1, t- 0,2,...,tf-2 is a PE outcome of the subgame starting in
round t resp. ttl
~t ~t ~ttl ~t;lr~ u- y resp. u - x .
Proof
The proof is similar to the proof of the propositions 2 and 4. PE strate-
gies are:
w N1 ~tf-1
f - (A~, x , .. . . At -2' x )f
,~ t -2
g-(y, A1, ... . Y f ~ At -1)f
with
At - Y if ut )1 yt
- N if ut ~1 yt
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Attl - Y if ut;l )2 xt`1
- N if ut~l ~2 xt~l, t- 0, 2, ... , tf-2.
Example (cf. de Zeeuw (1984), example 4.3.1)
Consider the policy game 3, figure 5 with tf - 2 bargaining rounds. In the
first round (t-0), the private sector (player 2) proposes u-(u(0),
u(1)) with u(0) -(ul(0), u2(0)) E U~ and u(1) -(ul(1), u2(1)) E U1. If
the government does not agree it can make a counterproposal ul -(u(0),
u(1)) with u(0) -(ul~, u2~): disagreement controls in first round and






Let the system's dynamics be:
x(0) - x~
x(1) - x(~) 4 ui(~) t u2(0)
x(2) - x(1) t ul(1) t u2(1)
and let J-(J1,J2) represent the players' preferences:
J1(ut) --~Ix2(0) t u12(0) t xz(1) t u1211) ' x2(2)J
J2(ut) --~ L2x2(0) 4 u22(0) t 2x2(1) 4 u22(1) t 2x2(2) J
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To find a PE outcome ~, first a PE outcome xl of the subgame starting at
t- 1 has to be computed. Applying proposition 11 gives:
zl E d21(u2) e~ xl - arg max J1(ul) s.t. J2(ul) 2 J2(u2)
~1u
The second step is to find ~ E d10(X1);
y E dl~(xl) e~ y- arg max JZ(u) s.t. J1( u) 2 J1(xl)
~0u
Clearly, the equilibrium depends heavily on the disagreement controls u2.
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6 Summary and Conclusion
Traditionally bargaining theory has focussed on 'general properties that
"any reasonable solution" should possess' (quotation Nash (1953). P. 136).
The Nash equilibrium (NE) axioms (see Nash (1950)) form the most famous
set of properties leading to one single outcome (the solution) of the
typical static two-person bargaining problem16. Modifications have been
proposed by Kalai and Smorondinsky (1975) and Binmore (1984).
Such an axiomatic approach is attractive because of it's generality. But
at the same time this means that it cannot take into account the role of
dynamic features of specific bargaining situations. This motivated Nash
(1953) to describe his static bargaining problem as a two-stage (exten-
sive) game; in the first stage disagreement strategies are announced (the
threats) and in the second stage the (simultaneous) demands are matched.
Following such a strategic approach (which concentrates on general proper-
ties that any reasonable strategy pair should possess) and applying the
basic Nash equilibrium (NE) concept (Nash (1951)), he found that in this
case dynamic NE strategies lead to the same solution as was singled out by
the static NE axioms. This strongly advocated the axiomr~tic approach.
However, if commitment is not possible, - which is typically the case in
most bargaining situations -, then the NE concept is not consistent, i.e.
it may involve threats for which it is not rational to execute them if an
opponent deviates from the equilibrium.
To rule out the possibility of such incredible thrests Selten (1975) re-
fined the NE concept and since Rubinstein (1982) implemented Selten's
perfect equilibrium (PE) concept into a simple but very natural bargainíng
framework, the strategic approach has received much renewed attention in
bargaining theory.
Startíng from Rubinstein's seminal model, several aspects of strategic
bargaining have been addressed in this paper. It is interesting to see how
procedures and outside options can affect the equilibrium moves and out-
comes in the bargaining game (section 2 and 3). If information is incom-
plete, the transmission of information (i.c. the way a reputation evolves)
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plays a crucial role in deriving equilibrium; moreover, in this case dis-
agreement can be explained (section 4).
Finally it is pointed out that the basic model can also be used to analyse
bargaining problems with other pay-off structures, such as policy games
(section 5). Another extension in this direction could be the introduction
of employment level as an additional goal (besides wage level) for the
union.
In addition to this, three topics seem important for further research.
Firstly, there is the question of how outcomes of the strategic approach
relate to outcomes of the axiomatic approach. For example in Bínmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) it is shown that some Rubinstein-type
models yield precisely the axiomatic asymmetric NE outcome in the limit
(as the length of bargaining rounds tend to zero). Secondly, to explain
disagreement, further analysis of models with incomplete information is
needed; the requirements that should be made on the transmission of infor-
mation is a central issue (see Rubinstein (1985b) for an overview of op-
tions; see also Kreps and Wilson (1982b) and Barro and Gordon (~983) for
applications in related area). Thirdly, the extension to three (or more)
players is s further challenge (see e.g. Binmore (1985), Haller (1986)).
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Notes
1. Since the insider-outsider model of section 3 can be seen as a genera-
lisation of the basic model, the effect of different reaction times in
the basic model follows as a special case. See Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky (1985) for the analysis of several effects in the basic mo-
del.
2. Originally perfect equilibrium (PE) was defined for extensive form
games with complete information. The generalisation to incomplete
information is given in Kreps and Wilson (1982a) and has become known
as sequential equilibrium (SE). See further section 4.
3. See section 6 for a discussion of different approaches.
4. These assumptions are maintained throughout the paper.
5. A discountfactor, bi, is inversely related to the corresponding dis-
-r.
countrate, say ri. For ri E[O.m) one can write bi - e 1, thus obtai-
ning bi E (0,1].
6. These assumptions also are maintained throughout the paper.
~. The importance of such utility-functions is emphasized in Fishburn and
Rubinstein ( 1982).
They show that preferences that satisfy the assumptions made thus far
(i.e. time is valuable for both, wage is desirable for the worker and
profit for the firm, continuity, stationarity and increasing compen-
sation) can be represented by utility-functions of the form ui(w,t) -
tgi vi(w), for some ~i E[0,1] and some continuous functions vi, with
vl increasing and v2 decreasing; i- 1,2.
For illustrative purposes vl(w) - w and v2(w) - 1-w are chosen.
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8. To define formally risk aversion within a bargaining round, consider
some wage y which is preferred by player i above some other wage x.
Let p. x~(1-p).y denote the lottery over x and y with probability p
and (1-p) respectively, p E(0,1). Let further z: - p x t(1-p)y be
the expected wage if the lottery is performed. Player i is said to be
risk averse (resp. risk neutral resp. risk loving) on the interval
[a,b] if
vx, y E [a,b] ~dp E (0,1):
y~i x~ z~i p. x~ (1-P) . Y
(resp. z ~i p. x 9 (1-P). Y~
resp. z ~i p. x~(1-p). y)
If the utility function satisfies the socalled expected utility pro-
perty ui ( z) - p u(x) f ( 1-p) u(y) ( see Von Neumann and Morgenstern
(1944)), then risk aversion is precisely a concave transformation over
the utilities.
T
9. That is: 1- y - 1-S is the unique PE profit that the firm
o (ltá)(1-bT-1)
shall propose ( Shaked and Sutton (1984), proposition).
10. This corresponding problem is to choose a point of utilities u-(ul,
u2) out of the possibility-set S, given a threat-point d-(dl, d2). The
Nash axioms ( Nash (1950)) then lead to the unique solution
N
u - arg max (ul-dl)(u2-d2).
uES
Currently S: -{(ul, u2) I ul t u2 S 1}
N
and d: -(0.0) (i.e. perpetual disagreement). Thus u-(}, ~).
11. In appendix A these conclusions are derived formally.
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12. To see this consider two possible events:
E1 : the firm is weak
E2(t) : round t is reached, t- 0,2,4,...
(i.e. the firm has rejected wt-1 and proposes wt)
According to Bayes' rule the worker's belief that the firm is weak
must satisfy:
p(t): - Pr {E1~E2(t)} - Pr {E1 n E2(t)} ~ Pr {E2(t)},
t- 0,2,4,... and Pr {E2(t)} ~ 0.
Thus if At-1 - N n wt - wt n~At-1 - Y v wt ~ wt~
then Pr {E1 n E2 (t)} - Pr {E2 (t)} and p(t) - 1.
AlsO if Át-1 - N n wt - wt n~At-1 - Y v wt ~ wt~
then Pr {E1 n E2(t)} - 0 and p(t) - 0.
Finally, if At-1 - At-1 - N n Wt - wt - wt then
Pr {E1 n E2(t)} - Pr {E1}, Pr {E2(t)} and p(t) - p(t-2).
13. See appendix B for the derivation of this result.
14. In a more general set up bargaining will concentrate on the shape of
the control functions Gi (i.e. on how future actions should be under-
taken, given the state reached) rather than on the value of the con-
trolvariables ui themselves (i.e. on what specific future actions
should be undertaken). The role of uncertainty, as reflected in the
appearance of time as an explicit argument in the functions F and Gi,
can then be taken into account.
This generalisation is left for further research.
15. An agreement is binding, i. e. once it is reached, none of the players
can deviate from the controls agreed upon. An other option is to con-
sider (non-binding) announcements rather than (binding) agreements.
Deviation from announcements on future actions is then allowed for,
but may lead to a loss of reputation ( see Barro and Gordon (1983))-
Iiicomplete information has then entered the game and in describing
equilibrium a crucial role is played by the way in which the reputa-
tion is assumed to evolve along all possible trajectories of the game
(see section 4).
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16. See note 11.




Let x- bl and y- b2 be the discountfactors of the worker and the firm
respectively.
The qualitative effect of changing discountfactors can be summarised as
follows:
Lemma
Let k E I1 and consider the function Fk : I x I~ I, I: -[0,1],
x(1-y) 1-xk ykFk (x,Y)- ' 1-xy 1-xk}1 yk
.
~ F ~ F
Then ~ xk z 0 and ~ yk 5 0,
Proof
vkEli.
c~ Fk ~ Fk
For k- 0, ~ x - ~ y - 0 because Fk (x,y) - 0.
k k
Let f(x.Y): ' 1-xy and Bk(x.Y): - 1-xktl k1-x y
~Fk ~fThen Fk - f ~ gk ~d ~ z - c1 z' gk 4~ z
~ f 1-y
~ x - (1-xy)2
~ f - x x-1
~ y - (1-xy)2
~ gk k yk (xk-xk-1) } xkyk(1-xk Yk)
1 x - (1-xk{1 yk)2
~ gk k yk-1 (xk~l - xk)
a y - (1-xk~l yk)2
`~ gk . f, z- x ~ y.
c~ g
Since f 2 0, gk ) 0, ~y 5 0 and ~ yk 5 0 the result for y follows imme-
~ F
diately: ~ yk s 0
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For x we can write:
(1-xy)2.(1-xk}1 Yk)2. ~ xk -(1-xk Yk).(1-xk}2 yk}1) f
(1-x y). k. xk yk (x-1)
Thus:
~ Fk k k k~2 ktl k k
cl x z o b(1-x Y )(1-x y ) t(1-x y) k x y (x-i). 2 0.
Fork21 , xy2xkyk
It is therefore sufficient tot show that:
1-xk`2 yktl f k xk yk (x-1) 2 0.
Finally, - xk41 yktl 5- xkt2 Yktl
and
xktl k 5 xktl ktl
Y Y
and thus it is sufficient to show that:
1-(xY)k}1 t k(xY)k}1 - k(xy)k 2 0.
The function hk(v): - 1- vk}1 f k vk{1 - k vk, v: - xyE [o,l) is decrea-
sing, d k- 1,2,... and lim hk(v) - 0.
v T 1
~ F





v b E(0,1) V a, p such that 0 5 oc ~ p 5 1:
[1-a . a b~~ 5 1 -~ 4 ~ b 1-a1-g b 1-a b`~ (a . p) b z 1]
Proof
Let b E ( 0,1) and O s a ( p s l.
Then
~- a- S b 1-a } a b(1-A) 5 01-a b 1-s b
o-a (J3-a)(1-ab)(1-Sb) - ~e b (1-a)(1-pb) t a b(1-~B)(1-ab) 5 0
~a A - S2 b- a t a2 b - A b t g2 b2 f a b - a2 b2 5 0
e~ (p-a)(1-b)(1 - (atg) b) 5 0
e~ (at~) b 2 1
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